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ABSTRACT
We present a model of flight to quality episodes that emphasizes systemic risk and the Knightian
uncertainty surrounding these episodes. Agents make risk management decisions with incomplete
knowledge.  They understand their own shocks, but are uncertain of how correlated their shocks are
with systemwide shocks. Aversion to this uncertainty leads them to question whether their private
risk management decisions are robust to aggregate events, generating conservatism and excessive
demand for safety. We show that agents’ actions lock-up the capital of the financial system in a
manner that is wasteful in the aggregate and can trigger and amplify a financial accelerator. The
scenario that the collective of conservative agents are guarding against is impossible, and known to
be so even given agents’ incomplete knowledge. A lender of last resort, even if less knowledgeable
than private agents about individual shocks, does not suffer from this collective bias and finds that
pledging intervention in extreme events is valuable. The benefit of such intervention exceeds its
direct value because it unlocks private capital markets.
Ricardo J. Caballero










a-krishnamurthy@northwestern.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
“... Policy practitioners operating under a risk-management paradigm may, at times, be led to
undertake actions intended to provide insurance against especially adverse outcomes...... When
confronted with uncertainty, especially Knightian uncertainty, human beings invariably attempt
to disengage from medium to long-term commitments in favor of safety and liquidity.... The
immediate response on the part of the central bank to such ﬁnancial implosions must be to inject
large quantities of liquidity...” Alan Greenspan (2004).
Flight to quality episodes are an important source of ﬁnancial and macroeconomic instability. Modern
examples of these episodes in the US include the Penn Central default of 1970; the stock market crash of
1987; the events of the Fall of 1998 beginning with the Russian default and ending with the bailout of LTCM;
as well as the events that followed the attacks of 9/11. Behind each of these episodes lies the specter of a
meltdown that may lead to a prolonged slowdown as in Japan during the 1990s, or even a catastrophe like
the Great Depression.1 In each of them, as hinted by Greenspan, the Fed intervened early and stood ready
to intervene “as much as needed” to prevent a meltdown.
Two questions immediately arise when considering these examples and Greenspan’s comments on ﬂight
to quality episodes. First, how can events that appear small relative to US private wealth create so much
havoc? Second, how can interventions by the Fed, that also appear small relative to US wealth, be eﬀective
in preventing a meltdown? In this paper we develop a model to address these questions. In short, our
answers are that during ﬂight to quality episodes private capital becomes locked up, and much of the power
of intervention derives from its ability to unlock this capital.
Our model builds on two observations about ﬂight to quality events. First, at a basic level these episodes
are about an increase in perceived “risk.” However, the risk does not circumscribe a purely fundamental
shock, and instead centers around the nerve center of the economy, the ﬁnancial system. For example, the
Russian default in the summer of 1998 eliminated a small fraction of the trillions of dollars of US wealth.
Although small, the default created circumstances that severely strained the ﬁnancial sector. As prices of
illiquid assets fell, losses grew in commercial banks, investment banks, and hedge funds, leading investors
to question the safety of the ﬁnancial sector. Investors withdrew risk-capital from the aﬀected markets and
institutions and moved into short-term and liquid assets. Bottlenecks in the movement of capital emerged
as sophisticated parts of the ﬁnancial system were compromised while other sectors of the economy were
relatively unaﬀected. The primary risk during this episode was ﬁnancial system risk.
1See Table 1 (part A) in Barro (2005) for a comprehensive list of extreme events in developed economies during the 20th
century.
2Second, the “risk” in these episodes is of an extreme nature. Most episodes are triggered by an unexpected
event that causes agents to re-evaluate their models of the world. In the Fall of 1998, the comovement of
Russian government bond spreads, Brazilian spreads, and U.S. Treasury bond spreads was a surprise to
even sophisticated market participants. These high correlations rendered standard risk management models
obsolete, leaving ﬁnancial market participants searching for new models. Agents responded by making
decisions using “worst-case” scenarios and “stress-testing” models, in a manner suggestive of Knightian
uncertainty. Indeed, the extreme disengagement from risky activities that Greenspan highlights suggests
that agents respond to more than just risk.
Our model focuses on agents’ perceptions regarding the ability of ﬁnancial intermediaries to deliver on
their ﬁnancial contracts. Agents contract with ﬁnancial intermediaries to cover liquidity shocks that may arise
in their markets. These risk management decisions are made with incomplete knowledge. Agents understand
their own shocks, but are uncertain about the probability model describing shocks in markets diﬀerent from
theirs and treat this uncertainty as Knightian. If ﬁnancial intermediaries have limited resources, agents
grow concerned that shocks may arise in other markets that will deplete the resources of intermediaries and
compromise their ability to deliver on their ﬁnancial contracts. Such riskiness rises either through an increase
in Knightian uncertainty or a fall in intermediaries’ assets. Thus our model combines the ﬁnancial system
risk as well as the Knightian uncertainty that underlies ﬂight to quality episodes.
The model captures two important aspects of ﬂight to quality episodes. First, the increase in perceived
riskiness generates conservatism and demand for safety. Second, we show that Knightian agents respond to
their uncertainty regarding other markets by requiring ﬁnancial intermediaries to lock-up some capital to
devote to their own markets’ shocks, regardless of what happens in other markets. By forcing intermediaries
to dedicate capital to cover their own shocks, agents ensure that their shocks are covered regardless of who
else receives shocks. However, once locked-up, intermediaries’ capital is not free to move across markets in
response to shocks, resulting in bottlenecks and market segmentation.
The capital bottlenecks have macroeconomic consequences, and lend support to Greenspan’s call for
central bank action during ﬂight to quality. While each Knightian agent covers himself against an extreme
shock, collectively these actions prevent intermediaries from moving capital across markets to expediently
oﬀset shocks as they arrive. We show that this inﬂexibility leaves the economy overexposed to (moderate)
aggregate shocks that are manageable by the private sector in the absence of ﬂight to quality. Moreover,
the scenario that the collective of conservative agents are guarding against is impossible, and known to be
so even given agents’ incomplete knowledge. Collectively, agents make poor risk management decisions that
lead to avoidable losses.
In this context, a lender of last resort, even if less informed than private agents about each agent’s
own market, can unlock private capital and stabilize the economy during moderate shocks. It does so
3by committing to intervene during extreme events where the ﬁnancial intermediaries’ capital is depleted.
Importantly, because these extreme events are highly unlikely, the expected cost of this intervention is
minimal. If credible, the policy derives its power from a private sector multiplier: each pledged dollar of
public intervention in the extreme event is matched by a comparable private sector reaction to free ﬂexible
resources to deal with moderate shocks. In this sense, the LTCM bailout was important not for its direct
eﬀect, but because it served as a signal of the Fed’s readiness to intervene should conditions worsen, which
unlocked private collateral.
Literature review. The model we develop and our prescriptions over the lender of last resort are most closely
related to the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model of bank runs. An important diﬀerence relative to the
Diamond and Dybvig model is that ours does not not involve a coordination failure. We will discuss the
relation to Diamond and Dybvig in greater depth after we introduce the model.
Our paper ﬁlls a gap in the literature on ﬁnancial frictions in business cycle models. Papers such as
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) highlight how ﬁnancial frictions in
ﬁrms amplify aggregate shocks. Instead, we emphasize how ﬁnancial frictions lead to greater (Knightian)
uncertainty in response to shocks, and how this rise in uncertainty feeds back into the ﬁnancial accelerator.
Our paper also studies the macroeconomic consequences of frictions in ﬁnancial intermediaries. In this
sense, our paper is closer to Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Krishnamurthy (2003) that emphasize that
with complete ﬁnancial contracts, the aggregate collateral of intermediaries is ultimately behind ﬁnancial
ampliﬁcation mechanisms.
In terms of the policy implications, Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) study how a shortage of aggregate
collateral limits private liquidity provision (see also Woodford, 1990). Their analysis suggests that a credible
government can issue government bonds which can then be used by the private sector for liquidity provision.
The key diﬀerence between our paper and those of Holmstrom and Tirole, and Woodford, is that we show how
even a large amount of collateral in the aggregate may be ineﬃciently used, so that private sector liquidity
provision is limited. In our model, the government intervention not only adds to the private sector’s collateral
but also, and more centrally, it improves the use of private collateral.
There is a growing economics literature that aims to formalize Knightian uncertainty (a partial list of
contributions includes, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Dow and Werlang (1992), Epstein and Wang (1994),
Hansen and Sargent (1995, 2003), Skiadas (2003), Epstein and Schneider (2004), and Hansen, et al. (2004)).
As in much of this literature, we use a max-min device to describe agents expected utility. Our treatment of
Knightian uncertainty is most similar to Gilboa and Schmeidler, in that agents choose a worst case among
a class of priors.
Our paper applies max-min expected utility theory to agents who we interpret as running ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
These ﬁrms typically stress-test their models to various extreme scenarios before formulating investment
4policies. The widespread use of Value-at-Risk as a decision making criterion is an example of robust decision
making in practice. Corporate liquidity management is also done with a worst case scenario for cash-ﬂows
in mind. We view the max-min preferences of the agents we study as descriptive of decision rules that
overweight a worst-case rather than as stemming from a deeper psychological foundation. In much of the
paper we refer to agents as robust decision makers. This terminology most closely corresponds to the decision
making process of the ﬁnancial institutions that concern us in this paper.
Routledge and Zin (2004) also begin from the observation that ﬁnancial institutions follow decision rules
to protect against a worst case scenario. They develop a model of market liquidity in which an uncertainty
averse market maker sets bids and asks to facilitate trade of an asset. Their model captures an important
aspect of ﬂight to quality: uncertainty aversion can lead to a sudden widening of the bid-ask spread, causing
agents to halt trading and reducing market liquidity. Both our paper and Routledge and Zin share the
emphasis on ﬁnancial intermediation and uncertainty aversion as central ingredients in ﬂight to quality
episodes. But each paper captures diﬀerent aspects of ﬂight to quality.
Easley and O’Hara (2005) study a model where ambiguity averse traders focus on a worst case scenario
when making an investment decision. Like us, Easley and O’Hara point out that government intervention
in a worst-case scenario can have large eﬀects.
Finally, in our model agents are only Knightian with respect to systemic events. Epstein (2001) explores
the home bias in international portfolios in a related setup, where agents are more uncertain about foreign
than local markets.2 As Epstein points out, this modelling also highlights the diﬀerence between high risk
aversion and aversion to Knightian uncertainty. Moreover, our modelling shows that max-min preferences
interact with macroeconomic conditions in ways that are not present in models with an invariant amount
of risk aversion. We show that when aggregate intermediary collateral is plentiful, Knightian and standard
agents behave identically. However when aggregate collateral falls, the actions of these agents diﬀer, leading
to ﬂight to quality in the Knightian model.
In Section 2 we describe the environment, while in Section 3 we describe decisions, equilibrium and ﬂight
to quality. Section 4 derives the value of a lender of last resort in our economy. Section 5 illustrates the
interaction between aggregate collateral and robustness considerations. Section 6 discusses moral hazard
problems and other critiques associated with the lender of last resort. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
We study a model conditional on entering a period of turmoil where Knightian uncertainty is high. Our
model is silent on what triggers the episode. In practice, we think that the occurrence of an unexpected
2Epstein’s model is closely related to our model in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2005).
5event, such as the LTCM or Enron crises, causes agents to re-evaluate their models and triggers robustness
concerns. We focus on the mechanisms that play out during the liquidity episode: How do agents’ robustness
concerns aﬀect prices and quantities? How do these robustness concerns interact with aggregate constraints?
What is the role of an outside liquidity provider such as the central bank?
The model is a variant of a bank-run model (e.g. Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). It has a set of competitive
agents and intermediaries. The agents are subject to liquidity shocks. As in the canonical Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) banking model, an agent may be “late” in which case he has no special liquidity needs, or he
may be “early” in which case he needs some liquidity immediately. We view the liquidity shocks as a parable
for a sudden need for capital by a ﬁnancial market specialist (e.g. a trading desk, hedge fund, market maker).
The agents sign ﬁnancial contracts with the intermediaries to provide them with liquidity insurance if they
are “early.” An intermediary can be thought of as a bank which extends a credit line to the specialists, or
as the top-level capital allocator in an investment bank.
We are interested in situations where the agents perceive that there is some chance that intermediaries
may not deliver the contracted liquidity insurance. In a bank run model, a central concern of agents is
that they will arrive too late to claim liquidity from an intermediary, and possibly not receive the liquidity.
We introduce this type of concern by assuming that early agents are further divided into those who receive
shocks ﬁrst and those who receive shocks second. Each intermediary is assumed to have a limited amount
of liquidity/collateral, Z, which it delivers to the agents. We normalize things so that in aggregate liquidity
(or collateral) is also Z, and no longer distinguish between one intermediary and the aggregate.
SHOCKS AND PROBABILITIES
Formally, there is a continuum of agents indexed by ω ∈ Ω ≡ [0,1].A g e n tω receives utility:
Uω =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
¯ u if late Probability: 1 − φω(1) − φω(2)
u(c1) if early and ﬁrst Probability: φω(1)
u(c2) if early and second Probability: φω(2)
u : R+ → R is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing, strictly concave and satisﬁes the condition
u0(0) = ∞.
Unlike the Diamond and Dybvig model, we assume that the shocks are correlated across agents. If shocks
occur, there is a ﬁrst wave, and then possibly a second wave. The ﬁrst wave of shocks occurs with probability
φ(1), and the second wave takes place with conditional probability φ(2|1).W ea s s u m et h a tφ(2|1) < 1,s o
that
1 ≥ φ(1) >φ (2) > 0 (1)
with φ(2) = φ(2|1)φ(1).
This condition states that, in aggregate, a single-wave event is more likely than the two-wave event. We
6will refer to the two-wave event as an extreme event, capturing an unlikely but severe liquidity crisis in which
many agents are aﬀected.
The shocks are aggregate in that they simultaneously aﬀect a mass of agents. We assume that if the ﬁrst
wave occurs, then one-half of the agents is hit by the shock. For agent ω, the probability that he receives a
shock ﬁrst, conditional on the ﬁrst wave of shocks occurring, is equal to
φω(1)
φ(1) . While for any given ω, the
conditional probability need not be one-half, the average conditional probability across all agents must be














There is a contracting time, date 0, where intermediaries oﬀer ﬁnancial contracts to provide liquidity
insurance to the agents. We assume all shocks are observable and contractible. There is no concern that
an agent will pretend to have a shock and collect on an insurance claim. We deﬁne two types of ﬁnancial
contracts that intermediaries oﬀer:
• s(ω) is a safe claim. This claim pays one to agent ω if he receives a shock regardless of whether the
shock is during the ﬁrst or second wave. The claim costs p(s,ω).
• r(ω) is a risky claim. This claim pays one to agent ω if he receives a shock during the ﬁrst wave, but
not if he receives its shock during the second wave. The claim costs p(r,ω).
We refer to the r claim as risky because it depends on the order of the agent in the sequence of shocks.
In the example of a bank-run, it reﬂects the feature where an agent may need liquidity but be second in line
to claim the liquidity.
These two ﬁnancial securities span the uncertainty in our economy. In principle one could introduce
securities that depend on the shock realizations over every subset of Ω. But given the securities we have
deﬁned, such securities will not be traded.3
INFORMATION
Agents purchase ﬁnancial claims from the intermediaries to insure against their liquidity shocks. In
making the insurance decisions, agents have a probability model of their liquidity shocks in mind. We
assume that agent-ω knows his probability of receiving a shock:
φω = φω(1) + φω(2).
3For example, we could imagine a security that pays one if both ω and ω0 receive a ﬁrst shock. However, agent ω has no use
for the ω0 indexation.
7However, and centrally to our model, agent ω is uncertain about the correlation between his own shock and
aggregate conditions. In particular he does not know the relative likelihood of being among the ﬁrst wave












Agent ω does not know the true probabilities φω(1) and φω(2). We use the notation φ
ω
ω(1), etc., to denote
agent-ω’s perception of the relevant true probability. Since agents know φω, θ
ω
ω is a suﬃcient statistic for
agent-ω’s unknown probabilities. Normalizing these probabilities by the aggregate shock probabilities is
convenient in the analysis.
Agents consider a range of probability-models θ
ω
ω in the set Θ,w i t hs u p p o r t[1 − K,1+K],a n dd e s i g n
insurance portfolios that are robust to their model uncertainty. We follow Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989)







ω] s.t. p(s,ω)s(ω)+p(r,ω)r(ω) ≤ w0 (3)
K captures the extent of agents’ uncertainty, while w0 is the initial endowment of agents.
In a ﬂight to quality event, such as the Fall of 1998 or 9/11, agents are unsure of how aggregate conditions
will impinge on their activities. They may have a good understanding of their own markets, but are unsure of
how the behavior of agents in other markets may aﬀect them. For example during 9/11, market participants
feared gridlock in the payments system. Each participant knew how much money he owed to others but was
unsure whether money owed to him would arrive. In our modeling, agents are certain about the probability
of receiving a shock, but are uncertain about the probability that their shocks will occur early relative to
others, or late relative to others.
We view agents’ max-min preferences in (3) as descriptive of their decision rules. The widespread use of
worst-case scenario analysis in decision making by ﬁnancial ﬁrms is an example of the robustness preferences
of such agents.4
SYMMETRY
To simplify our analysis we assume that the agents are symmetric at date 0. While each agent’s true θω
may be diﬀerent, the θω for every agent is drawn from the same Θ.
The symmetry applies in other dimensions as well: φω,K,w 0, and u(c) are the same for all ω.M o r e o v e r ,
this information is common knowledge.
We assume that the aggregate shock probabilities, φ(1) and φ(2), are known by all agents. We may
think that agents observe the past behavior of the economy and form precise estimates of these aggregate
4See also Routledge and Zin (2004) for a discussion of max-min behavior among ﬁnancial specialists.
8probabilities. However the same past data does not reveal whether a given ω is more likely to be in the ﬁrst
wave or the second wave.
INTERMEDIARIES
Financial intermediaries have a limited capacity to deliver liquidity insurance. Each intermediary is
endowed with some goods to deliver to its claimholders. These goods can be thought of as the intermediary’s
liquid funds or as the collateral/capital of an intermediary. A better capitalized/collateralized intermediary
may have more goods and can thereby credibly sell more liquidity insurance. In aggregate, there are Z units
of these goods. For much of our analysis, we assume that Z is constant. In Section 5 we study the eﬀect of
varying aggregate collateral Z (as in Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997).
Agents recognize that intermediaries have limited resources. Denote by R and S the aggregate amount
of risky and safe claims sold by intermediaries, respectively. Agents can observe total liabilities and collateral
assets for each intermediary. The agents require that each intermediary has suﬃcient assets to cover the
liabilities in all states of the world. If the ﬁrst wave occurs, one-half of the agents will be aﬀected and
the intermediaries pay out R+S
2 .5 If the second wave occurs, the remaining one-half is aﬀected and the
intermediaries pay out S
2. Then, the collateral constraint for the intermediaries is:
R
2
+ S ≤ Z (4)
Ar e p r e s e n t a t i v ei n t e r m e d i a r y ’ so b j e c t i v ei st om a x i m i z et h ed a t e0r e v e n u ef r o mt h es a l eo ft h ei n s u r a n c e





2)],β ≥ 0 (5)
and subject to the collateral constraint in (4). The intermediary is a standard expected utility maximizer,
with linear preferences. It does not need to know the true θω of each agent in selling insurance. Knowledge
of φ(1), φ(2), and ex-ante symmetry of agents are suﬃcient to compute the expectation in equation (5).
RELATION TO DIAMOND AND DYBVIG (1983)
An important distinction between our model and the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model of bank runs
is our assumption of complete state-contingent markets. In Diamond and Dybvig the sequential service
constraint creates a possible coordination failure. The coordination failure informs the discussion of bank
runs and policy intervention. Our model does not impose a sequential service constraint. Agents are able
to write complete state-contingent contracts on the order of the shocks. The amount of early liquidation by
agents is predetermined by date 0 contracts rather than by coordination failure among agents.
5Since it is common knowledge that agents are symmetric, agents know that r(ω)=R. Since one-half of the agents receive
the shock in the ﬁrst wave, R/2 of risky claims are settled by the intermediaries. Also note that since each intermediary has a
continuum of clients, it faces no uncertainty on the quantities to be delivered in each aggregate state.
9In Diamond and Dybvig, the bank run triggers unanticipated withdrawals and default by the bank.
In our model, agents recognize that intermediaries may default because they have limited Z and impose
the collateral constraint of equation (4). However, in our complete markets model default never occurs in
equilibrium. This is because, with complete markets, agents anticipate the state of the world where the
intermediary’s liabilities lead it to default, and rewrite contracts so as to reduce the liabilities exactly to the
point where no default occurs. Thus default is central in the calculations of agents but, and as a result, does
not occur in equilibrium.6
3 Knightian Uncertainty and Flight to Quality
In this section we describe agents’ decisions and equilibrium, and connect robustness concerns with ﬂight-
to-quality episodes.
3.1 The cost of locking collateral
The problem of a ﬁnancial intermediary is to sell b r(ω) risky claims and b s(ω) safe claims, at prices p(r,ω)
and q(r,ω), in order to maximize revenue less the actuarial cost of providing liquidity insurance, subject to





[(p(r,ω) − βφω(1))b r(ω)+( p(s,ω) − β(φω(1) + φω(2)))b s(ω)]dω.
Because agents are ex-ante symmetric, their decisions are identical and intermediaries oﬀer insurance at the
same prices to all agents. For brevity, we omit the argument ω in the decisions and price functions and let
R and S denote the aggregated claims sold to agents.
Recall that it is common knowledge that if the ﬁrst aggregate shock hits, one-half of the agents are
aﬀected. Likewise, if the second aggregate shock hits, the other one-half of the agents is aﬀected. Since the
















6In practice, liquidity shocks trigger dynamic trading in asset markets — for example, by shedding risky assets and moving
to Treasury Bills — so that agents’ responses are ex-post and not all ex-ante. While interesting, we deliberately removed these
features from our framework through a complete Arrow-Debreu markets assumption which, as usual, allows us to state a
dynamic problem as a static one.
Our objective is to provide an endogenous explanation for why capital does not move across markets, as opposed to making
an exogenous segmentation/incomplete markets assumption. The assumption of complete liquidity-shock-contingent claims
isolates the mechanism we highlight. As a matter of interpretation, the ex-ante insurance contracts can be thought of as
collateralized contingent credit-lines.
10The intermediary must satisfy the collateral constraint in (4):
R
2
+ S ≤ Z.
Because of the linearity of the objective function, if the collateral constraint does not bind the solution








For example, when β =1 , prices are actuarially fair at an interior solution.











where µ ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier on the collateral constraint. A positive multiplier in the cost of
insurance reﬂects that the intermediary has limited resources and hence the opportunity cost of selling one
type of insurance claims is selling less of the other. Safe claims use up twice the amount of collateral as a
risky claim, given our assumption that one-half of the agents are aﬀected in a ﬁrst shock. If the intermediary
sells one less safe claim, then it can credibly sell two more risky claims. This logic leads the intermediary to
factor twice the cost of the collateral constraint when selling safe claims over risky claims.7
We are most interested in the opportunity cost of using collateral, as opposed to the actuarial cost of
writing liquidity insurance. To simplify some of our expressions, we assume for now that β =0and thereby





This pricing expression is the main result from modelling the supply side of the economy. It captures the
equilibrium cost of “locking” collateral. In Section 5 we revisit the case of β>0.
3.2 The agent’s decision problem









ω(2)u(c2)+( 1− φω)¯ u (8)
7Note that if the ﬁrst and second waves were mutually exclusive events, then the intermediary could use the same collateral
to back liquidity insurance in each event (i.e., it would separate the ﬁrst and second wave collateral constraints). In this case
the tradeoﬀ of collateral would only be one for one between risky and safe claims, and the only binding constraint would be
that for claims sold for agents hit on the ﬁrst wave. In contrast, in our models waves take place sequentially and hence are not
mutually exclusive.
11where,












ω(2) = φω − φ
ω
ω(1).
The expressions for c1 and c2 come from our earlier deﬁnitions of risky and safe claims: the risky claim pays
oﬀ only in the ﬁrst shock, while the safe claim pays oﬀ in both ﬁrst and second shocks.
For the moment, let us consider the problem in (8) for a given value of θ
ω
ω (i.e we drop the min operator).









where ψ is the Lagrange multiplier on the agent’s budget constraint.














From the deﬁnition of θ
ω












The right hand side of this expression are equilibrium prices. From our analysis of the intermediary’s problem,













ω aﬀects the agent’s decisions by altering the perceived odds of being ﬁrst or second.
An agent who considers a higher value of θ
ω
ω chooses higher c2 and lower c1. He can achieve this
consumption pattern by holding relatively more safe claims and less risky claims. Since all claims have to
be fully collateralized by the intermediary, in demanding more safe claims, the agent also forces the bank
to set aside more collateral to cover shocks that will happen second. In terms of the bank-run example we
have used, an agent who thinks that he is likely to be last in line at the bank, requires the bank to set aside
resources for when he does arrive at the bank.
We now turn to the robustness step. The agent makes his insurance choices while being robust to
alternative values of θ
ω
ω. In the game-theoretic language often used to describe max-min expected utility
theory, the agent ﬁrst chooses r and s, then “nature” chooses θ
ω
ω ∈ Θ to minimize the utility of agent A,
given his choices.
12If u(c1) >u (c2),f r o m( 8 ) ,w es e et h a tn a t u r ew i l ls e tφ
ω
ω(2), and thus θ
ω
ω, as high as possible. That
is, when the agent is more insured against being hit ﬁrst than second, the worst-case for the agent is that
his true θ
ω
ω is equal to 1+K. On the other hand, if u(c1) <u (c2), nature will do the opposite and set
θ
ω
ω =1− K.A tu(c1)=u(c2), the expected utility from the agent’s decisions are independent of θ
ω
ω.
The agent makes his decisions anticipating this behavior by nature. First, suppose that K is small so
that θ
ω
ω is near one. In this case c1 >c 2 so that nature will choose θ
ω










As K rises, the right-hand side of this expression falls and c1/c2 falls toward one. When,




the right-hand side is equal to one, and c1 = c2. We refer to this situation as the fully robust case since
agents’ decisions are robust to their uncertainty over φω(1) and φω(2).
Notice that if K rises past ¯ K, the agent will not change his decision. This is because if the agent chooses
c1 <c 2, then nature will set θ
ω
ω =1− K. Anticipating this action, the agent will prefer to choose c1 = c2.
Finally, note that equilibrium in this economy is unique. Given the supply determined relative price,
p(s)=2 p(r)=2 p, ac h a n g ei np only has income eﬀects. Agents’ demands are inﬁnite at p =0and decrease
monotonically toward zero as p rises. The following proposition summarizes these results:
Proposition 1 The following insurance decisions constitute an equilibrium in the robust economy:
• For 0 ≤ K<¯ K ≡
φ(1)














We refer to this as the “partially robust” case.









We refer to this as the “fully robust” case.
3.3 Flight to quality
In the partially robust solution, every agent chooses c1 >c 2. To achieve this consumption pattern, agents
choose r = c1 − c2 and s = c2.A sK rises, so that the uncertainty for agents rises, c1 and c2 converge to
13each other. Agents lower r and increase s. At the fully robust solution, agents set c1 = c2 = s and r =0 .
The pattern of shedding risky claims in favor of safe claims is central to ﬂight to quality episodes.
Interpreting the ﬁnancial claims of agents as credit lines from banks, the rise in K generates a “run” on
banks’ credit facilities.8 The agents recognize that banks have limited resources to back up their credit lines.
The concern of each agent is that his shock will occur after the average agents’ shocks, at which point the
bank’s limited credit facility will have been depleted.9 By setting r =0 ,s>0, agents insulate themselves
from this concern.
In practice, the robustness action may be reﬂected by an agent preemptively drawing down a credit line
at a date when the fear of other agents’ shocks arises. As markets are complete in our model, the future
action by each agent is prearranged at date 0. Alternatively, we can think of these actions as agents shifting
their demands towards well capitalized intermediaries, where it is unlikely that the intermediary’s resources
will be depleted. This portfolio shift is common in ﬂight to quality episodes.
We can also interpret the eﬀect of a rise in K on equilibrium in terms of intermediaries’ capital allocation
decision. By choosing r =0 ,s > 0, agents force intermediaries to reserve some resources to cover the
agents’ own shocks, regardless of when these shocks occur. s of the capital of an intermediary is locked-up
(“committed capital”), and r of the capital is free (“trading capital”) to allocate to the ﬁrst agents who
receive shocks. As θ
ω
ω rises, r falls and there is less trading capital to allocate ﬂexibly. In the fully robust
case, all of the intermediary’s capital is locked-up and there is no capital mobility.
The latter interpretation captures a feature shared by most ﬂight to quality episodes. Bottlenecks arise
in the movement of capital and markets appear segmented. For example, in the Fall of 1998 episode the
markets where hedge funds specialized were particularly aﬀected by the crisis, as (abundant) capital did not
ﬂow into these markets.
For a ﬁxed K, an alternative way to generate ﬂight to quality in our model is to reduce Z. We explain this
case in more detail in Section 5, but the intuition is clear enough. A fall in Z increases ﬁnancial intermediary
risk as agents grow concerned that intermediaries may not have enough resources to cover their shocks.
Agents worry about being second and raise θω. Some episodes, such as the Fall of 1998, can be thought of
in terms of ﬁnancial intermediary risk.
8Although the actions of agents in our model are most naturally interpreted as a run on banks’ credit facility, at a deeper
level, agents’ actions are also related to the more commonly analyzed run on banks’ deposits. As Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
emphasize, a deposit contract implements an optimal shock-contingent allocation of liquidity. In the fully robust equilibrium
of our model, agents choose an allocation that is non-contingent on each other’s shocks. Agents each hoard liquidity to cover
their own shocks, independent of other markets’ shocks. In this sense, robust agents’ preference for shock-independent liquidity
allocations is related to the behavior of panicked depositors in a bank run.
9We can also interpret robustness in terms of the internal risk management of an investment bank. Each ω is a trading desk
of an investment bank. Each ω lobbies for more risk capital, because of fear that other agents will suﬀer losses soon, reducing
the bank’s total risk capital.
144 Collective Bias and the Lender of Last Resort
In the fully robust equilibrium of Proposition 1 agents insure equally against ﬁrst and second shocks. To







Suppose we compute the probability of one and two aggregate shocks using agents’ conservative probabilities.
Then,






where the two in this expression reﬂects the fact that only half of agents are aﬀected by the ﬁrst aggregate
shock. Likewise,






Together, these computations imply that agents’ conservative probabilities are such that,
¯ φ(1) = ¯ φ(2).
Implicit in the conservative probabilities, the economy is perceived as equally likely to receive one or two
aggregate shocks. But we know (and all agents know) that actually φ(1) >φ (2), which implies that agents’
conservative probabilities are collectively biased.
Since each agent is concerned about the scenario in which he receives a shock last and the intermediary’s
resources have been depleted, robustness considerations lead each agent to bias upwards the probability
of receiving a shock later than the average agent. But collectively, every agent cannot be later than the
“average.”
These points carry over to the partially robust equilibrium. For any K>0, robust agents set θ
ω
ω =
1+m i n [ K, ¯ K],i m p l y i n gt h a t ,
φ
ω

















When K>0 the last inequality is strict, showing that agents conservative probabilities are collectively
biased.
Note that each agent’s conservative probabilities are individually plausible. Given the range of uncertainty
over θω, it is possible that agent ω has a higher than average probability of being second. Only when viewed
from the aggregate does it becomes apparent that agents’ collective probabilities are implausible. These
15observations motivate us to study how a central bank, which is interested in maximizing the collective, can
improve on outcomes.
4.1 Central bank objective and information
The central bank maximizes the average utility that agents derive from their choices. In computing this
average, we assume that the central bank uses its own probability assessments rather than the agents’. We
also assume that the central bank equally weights the utility of every agent. The latter assumption follows
because agents are observationally identical at date 0. The former assumption is more delicate.
When agents have non-Savage preferences, at least two approaches seem defensible: The central bank
objective uses both the agents’ preferences and the agents’ conservative probability assessments; Or, the
central bank takes a more paternalistic approach in which it is concerned with agents’ ex-post average utility
from consumption, but not evaluated at the agents’ collectively biased conservative probability assessments.
We follow the latter path but conclude the section by showing that both approaches have similar implications
for the welfare gains associated to the presence of a lender of last resort.
As noted earlier in the paper, we think of the robustness preferences as a realistic depiction of the
decision rules of ﬁnancial specialists (e.g., worst-case scenario analysis). These preferences are useful because
they reproduce the behavior of agents in ﬂight to quality situations where they are faced with Knightian
uncertainty. From this perspective, it is not obvious that a central bank should build biases into its objective
function that may lead to obvious average losses, just because agents exhibit these biases.10












c1,ω,c 2,ω are the consumption resulting from agents’ insurance decisions, while φ
CB
ω (1), etc., are the central
bank’s assessments of the probabilities of the relevant events. We note again that the central bank uses
agents’ utility function of u(c) to evaluate their consumption decisions, but discounts u(c) using its own
probability assessments, rather than the agents’ conservative probability assessments.
Importantly, we do not assume that the central bank knows the true θωs of agents. Since the agents’
biases stem from a lack of knowledge of how aggregates impinge on their activities, we also assume that the
central bank lacks knowledge over θω. In fact, for all of our results in this section we can assume that the
10Sims (2001) has made a related point in questioning the application of robust control to central bank policymaking. He
argues that max-min preferences are simply shortcuts to generate observed behavior of economic agents, but should not be seen
as deeper preferences. Note, however, that the collective bias we identify would be solved by a central bank, even if it uses
robust control for its decisions.
11We have omitted the constant term involving ¯ u in this objective.
16central bank knows strictly less than the agents; i.e. that the K of the central bank is larger than the K of
agents.
The central bank, like the agents, knows both aggregate probabilities and that one-half of the agents is

















We may imagine that the central bank and individual agents are able to form precise estimates over the
aggregate behavior of shocks from observing past data.
4.2 Collective risk management and wasted collateral
Consider a central bank that alters agents’ decisions by increasing c1,ω by an inﬁnitesimal amount, and
decreasing c2,ω by the same amount. This can be implemented, for a given amount of intermediaries’

















The budget constraint for every agent is that,
p(r)r + p(s)s = w0.
Since the central bank knows that all agents face the same prices and have the same wealth level, it can
conclude that c1,ω = c1 for all ω. Then, we can write,

























Again, given that agents face the same prices and have the same wealth level, the central bank can conclude
that c1,ω = c1 for all ω. Then substituting the agents’ ﬁrst order condition into the central bank’s objective,
17we ﬁnd,




























We summarize these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 For any K>0, agent decisions are collectively biased. Agents choose too much insurance
against receiving shocks second relative to receiving shocks ﬁrst. A central bank that maximizes the expected
(ex-post) utility of agents in the economy can improve outcomes by reallocating agent insurance away from
safe claims and toward risky claims.
The reallocation is valuable to the central bank because from the central bank’s perspective agents are
wasting aggregate collateral by using too many safe claims in a scenario where the more likely shock (the
ﬁrst one) is insurable with risky claims. The portfolio of insurance is important when aggregate collateral is
limited because risky claims lock only half as much collateral as safe claims do (i.e. the collateral constraint is
R/2+S ≤ Z). Thus by shifting agents’ decisions toward more risky claims and less safe claims, intermediaries
do not have to tie up as much of their resources to cover a second-shock that may never occur.
Finally, note that the central bank reaches these conclusions requiring only knowledge of aggregate
probabilities. As we have remarked, the central bank may be much more confused than individual agents
about individual θωs. In this sense, the central bank may be the least informed agent of the economy. The
important point is that the central bank does not suﬀer from collective bias.12
4.3 Lender of last resort
The somewhat abstract reallocation experiment discussed above highlights how central bank policy choices
may diﬀer from robust agents’ policy choices. More concretely, we now focus on the value of a lender of
last resort (LLR) in the robust equilibrium. We assume that the central bank obtains resources ex-post,
at some cost, which it can credibly pledge to agents in the two-shock event.13 In practice, this pledge may
12If the central bank were to be uncertain about the values of φ(1) and φ(2), then we could overturn our result. In particular, we
may imagine a situation in which the central bank is uncertain about these probabilities, and its objective function overweights
liquidity crises (i.e. the incidence of both shocks occurring). In this case, the biased central bank will also be subject to the
“overinsurance” bias of agents. However, this “bias” is of a diﬀerent nature than the one we emphasize as it would not be
collectively inconsistent with conditional probabilities.
13As in Woodford (1990) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), the LLR has access to collateral that intermediaries do not (or
at least, it has access at a lower cost). Woodford and Holmstrom and Tirole focus on the direct value of intervening using this
collateral. Our analysis focuses on the gains beyond the direct value of the intervention.
18be supported by costly ex-post inﬂation or taxation and carried out by guaranteeing, against default, the
liabilities of ﬁnancial intermediaries who have sold ﬁnancial claims to both markets. We analyze the impact
and marginal beneﬁt of such a guarantee.
Formally, the central bank credibly expands the collateral of the ﬁnancial sector in the two-shock event
by an amount ZG. Thus, the collateral constraints on intermediaries are altered to
R
2
+ S ≤ Z + ZG.
Since we are interested in computing the marginal beneﬁt of intervention, we study an inﬁnitesimal inter-
vention of ZG.
If the central bank oﬀers more insurance against the two-shock event, this insurance has a direct beneﬁt







ω (2)u0(c2,ω)dω = φ(2)u0(c2)
where the 2 in front reﬂects the fact that an extra unit of collateral for the second shock yields two units of
consumption for the group (of measure one half) that is hit by the second wave.
However, the anticipation of the central bank’s second-shock insurance leads agents to reoptimize their
insurance decisions. Agents reduce insurance against the second-shock (reduce safe claims) and increase
their ﬁrst-shock claims (increase risky claims). The total beneﬁt of the intervention includes both the direct

















Since c1,ω + c2,ω =( R + S)+S =2 ( Z + ZG), the reoptimization of each agents’ portfolios must sum up to





As we have shown, a reoptimization of agents’ portfolio away from safe claims and towards risky claims
has a ﬁrst-order beneﬁt in the robust equilibrium. The following proposition conﬁrms this additional value
in the context of the lender of last resort:


































19We can now substitute using the ﬁrst order condition for agents’ decision to arrive at,
V total













The last step follows since agents substitute some of the second-shock insurance of the LLR toward purchasing
ﬁrst-shock insurance.
4.4 Welfare equivalence and paternalism
We conclude this section by revisiting the non-paternalistic case, where we compute welfare using agents’
subjective and conservative probabilities. It turns out that there is still an important value to the LLR
beyond its objective direct value. There is no indirect beneﬁt from reallocation (by the envelope theorem),












That is, the LLR has an extra beneﬁt which comes from reducing the “anxiety” of robust agents.












This means that in the fully robust case the value of anxiety reduction (from the agents’ perspective) is equal
to the value of insurance reallocation (from the central bank’s perspective). While the exact equivalence
result carries over to the partially robust case only for the case of log-preferences, even in the partially robust
case there is an extra beneﬁt due to anxiety reduction.
Comparing the paternalistic and non-paternalistic perspectives, we note that agents value the intervention
more because they exaggerate the probability of the event that is being subsidized, while the central bank
values the intervention because the subsidy reduces private collateral waste. The latter eﬀect means that if
the economy were to be drawn inﬁnite times, all agents would receive higher average ex-post utility beyond
the direct ex-post beneﬁt of intervention. The agent perceives this additional beneﬁt ex-ante, although for
the “wrong” reasons.
205 Price of Liquidity and Collateral Risk
Up to now we have analyzed a model where intermediaries factor zero actuarial cost when setting the prices
of liquidity insurance (i.e., β =0 ). For this case, the intermediaries’ ﬁrst order condition pins down the
relative price of safe to riskless claims to be constant and independent of the agents’ portfolio decisions.
Although ﬁxing relative prices allows for a particularly straightforward algebraic analysis, it hides some of
the mechanisms underlying the model.
When β>0, agents’ robustness concerns have important price eﬀects. In the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h i ss e c t i o n ,
we elaborate on these price eﬀects to further clarify our model. In the second part we show that robustness
considerations exacerbate the costs of collateral reductions. The latter point is the main substantive result
in this section.
As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), reductions in collateral (or collateral values in their model) trigger a
ﬁnancial accelerator. Our model illustrates a further channel for ampliﬁcation. Reductions in aggregate col-
lateral lead to a ﬂight-to-quality which locks already scarce collateral and ampliﬁes the ﬁnancial accelerator.
We set β =1 , so that intermediaries now factor in the actuarial cost of disbursing insurance resources in
the ﬁrst and second shocks.
5.1 Abundant collateral
Starting with a benchmark, suppose that Z is large enough so that, at equilibrium levels of demand, the




























At K =0 , agents choose c1 = c2. I ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a tf o rK>0 agents continue to choose c1 = c2.
This choice remains optimal because by choosing c1 = c2, agents’ decisions are robust to the unknown
probabilities, and the robust decision rule still does best.
When there is abundant intermediary collateral, the equilibrium is unaﬀected by agents’ robustness
concerns. Agents know that intermediaries will not default on their insurance claims. Thus, they are not
21concerned about their shock being ﬁrst or second relative to other agents. Their uncertainty about the shock
ordering becomes irrelevant.14
Using the budget constraint for agents, we can calculate that facing the actuarially fair prices p(r) and
p(s), agents will choose,




In order for intermediaries to not be collateral constrained in equilibrium,15




5.2 Price of liquidity and aggregate shortage
Suppose next that Z falls below Z. Then, at actuarially fair prices, agents’ demand saturates the collateral











where µ>0 is the Lagrange multiplier on the intermediaries’ collateral constraint.
We can compute these prices explicitly using the budget constraint for the agent (p(r)r + p(s)s = w0)
and the intermediary collateral constraint (r
2 + s = Z):














1. A fall in c1 and equal rise in c2 causes the prices of both risky and safe claims to rise.
2. A fall in c1 and equal rise in c2 causes the relative price ratio,
p(s)
p(r) − 1,t or i s e .
3. The economy has an aggregate liquidity shortage.
As we have shown in the previous section, when agents’ uncertainty rises they purchase more safe claims,
thereby decreasing c1 and increasing c2. These actions lead to a rise in the equilibrium price of both ﬁnancial
claims (point 1), as well as to a rise in the relative price of safe claims over risky claims (point 2).
14The irrelevance result in the case of abundant collateral also relates to discussions in the asset pricing literature as to when
the actions of “rational" agents will eliminate any eﬀects stemming from the biases of “irrational" agents. In our model, the
intermediaries are Bayesian and risk-neutral, but are subject to a constraint whereby they have to hold collateral to back-up
any short-sales of ﬁnancial securities. When there is suﬃcient intermediary collateral, the short-sale constraint does not bind
and prices reﬂect the rational intermediaries’ valuations. It is a feature of our model that agents’ insurance decisions are not
collectively biased at the actuarially fair prices.
15In the β =0case we have studied earlier ¯ Z is inﬁnite because intermediaries are always at a corner solution in their
insurance sales.
22Point 3, regarding the aggregate liquidity shortage, is an important aspect of our model. To clarify this
point, consider the following thought experiment. Suppose we introduce a small number of Savage (Bayesian)
a g e n t si n t ot h ee c o n o m yw h oa l s oa r es u b j e c tt oﬁrst and second shocks and wish to insure against these
shocks. A rise in K increases the price of liquidity insurance for all agents in the economy, both robust and
Savage agents. In this sense, ﬂight to quality in our model is not just a problem aﬀecting the decision rules
of robust agents. It has a larger cost because the actions of robust agents raise insurance prices and thereby
distort the insurance of all agents in the economy.
The mechanism behind the increase in prices is the collateral lock-up eﬀect. This eﬀect becomes partic-
ularly transparent if we examine the risky claim. The risky claim price rises as robustness rises; but, as we
have shown earlier, robust agents actually decrease their demand for risky claims as robustness rises. Thus
the increase in price of the risky claim is indirect. Agents increase their demand for safe claims, causing
intermediaries to lock-up collateral to cover their shocks and thereby decreasing the amount of collateral that
is free to back risky claims. That is, since safe claims lock up twice the amount of collateral as risky claims
(i.e. R/2+S ≤ Z), as robustness concerns rise, agents force the intermediaries to lock up more collateral.
The intermediaries’ limited Z is used ineﬃciently, leading to a smaller eﬀective Z of the economy and higher
insurance prices.
We can think of claim prices as the marginal cost of liquidity provision in the economy. Since intermedi-
aries have a limited amount of collateral to back liquidity provision, at the aggregate level, Z parameterizes
the capacity of the economy to provide liquidity to agents. Our model shows that the actions of robust
agents decreases the eﬀective amount of liquidity provided to the entire economy.
Reductions in aggregate liquidity provision by ﬁnancial intermediaries and a corresponding rise in ﬁnancial
liquidity premia are two central ingredients in most descriptions of ﬂight to quality events. With a richer
market structure — e.g. if each ω was a separate asset market — the rise in the cost of liquidity provision
would also be reﬂected as higher liquidity premia in the asset markets where the agents are active.
5.3 Collateral reduction and ﬂight to quality
We next study how a fall in Z,f o rﬁxed K,a ﬀects the equilibrium of the economy. Thus far we have
described a ﬂight to quality event in terms of increasing K. We now show that our model generates similar
implications from a decrease in Z.












2w0 − (φ(1) − φ(2))c1
2w0 +( φ(1) − φ(2))c2
(12)
where the second equality follows from Proposition 4. Additionally, from the collateral constraint of inter-







Equations (12) and (13) jointly deﬁne the equilibrium values of c1 and c2 as a function of Z. We are interested
in examining how c1 and c2 change as Z falls below Z.L e tu sw r i t ec2 =2 α(Z)Z and c1 =2 ( 1− α(Z))Z,
and study the function α(Z).A sw eh a v er e m a r k e de a r l i e r ,f o rZ ≥ Z, c1 is equal to c2 so that α(Z)=1
2.
Proposition 5 Suppose that K =0 . Moreover, suppose that −c
u00(c)
u0(c) is weakly decreasing in c.T h e n
comparing equilibria across economies with diﬀerent levels of Z, the (unique) equilibrium value of α falls as
Z falls. That is, as Z falls, the ratio of insurance devoted to the ﬁrst shock over that to the second shock
rises.
Proof. When K equals zero, θ
ω







w0 − (φ(1) − φ(2))(1 − α)Z
w0 +( φ(1) − φ(2))αZ
.
The ﬁrst order condition in (12) is satisﬁed when F(α(Z),Z)=0 . Implicitly diﬀerentiating F,w eﬁnd that
sign(dα

























w0 − (φ(1) − φ(2))(1 − α)Z
w0 +( φ(1) − φ(2))αZ
µ
(φ(1) − φ(2))(1 − α)
w0 − (φ(1) − φ(2))(1 − α)Z
+
(φ(1) − φ(2))α
w0 +( φ(1) − φ(2))αZ
¶

















w0 +( φ(1) − φ(2))αZ
µ
1 −
w0 − (φ(1) − φ(2))(1 − α)Z
w0 +( φ(1) − φ(2))αZ
¶
This term is negative. Therefore sign(dα
dZ ) is positive. We also note that the equilibrium is unique since ∂F
∂α
is negative for all α.
The K =0case corresponds to the central bank’s solution we have derived in the previous sections. As Z
falls, the allocation between ﬁrst and second shock insurance reﬂects the limited availability of intermediary
resources. Since the ﬁrst shock is more likely then the second shock, the central bank allocates more resources
to the ﬁrst shock than to the second shock.
Consider next the robust economy where K>0. We begin with a heuristic description of how equilibrium
is aﬀected by Z.F o rZ ≥ Z, agents set c1 equal to c2. Starting from this point, suppose that Z falls slightly
below Z. If agents act as if θ
ω
ω =1 , they will decrease c2 and increase c1 slightly (see Proposition 5). However,
this will leave them exposed to the possibility that θω is high. Taking this into account, agents will consider
24a larger θ
ω
ω when making decisions. For Z close to Z,as m a l li n c r e a s ei nθ
ω
ω is suﬃcient for agents to choose
the fully robust insurance decisions. As Z falls suﬃciently below Z, θ
ω
ω reaches its maximum 1+K,w i t hc1
larger than c2. In this case, agent decisions are partially robust.
Proposition 6 Suppose that −c
u
00(c)
u0(c) is weakly decreasing in c. Then comparing (the unique) equilibria
across economies with diﬀerent levels of Z, we have the following results. For a given value of Z,r o b u s t
agents make equilibrium decisions as if,
θ
ω
ω =1+m i n ( K, ¯ K(Z − Z)),
where,
1+ ¯ K(Z − Z) ≡
φ(1)
φ(2)
2w0 − (φ(1) − φ(2))Z
2w0 +( φ(1) − φ(2))Z
.
• Since ¯ K(Z − Z) increases as Z falls, θ
ω
ω i n c r e a s e s( w e a k l y )a sZ falls.
• For Z such that θ
ω
ω =1+ ¯ K(Z − Z), agent decisions are fully robust.
• For Z small enough that θ
ω












w0 − (φ(1) − φ(2))(1 − α)Z
w0 +( φ(1) − φ(2))αZ
.
Nature will choose θ
ω
ω =1+K if α<1
2; θ
ω
ω =1− K if α>1
2; and is indiﬀerent over θ
ω
ω ∈ [1 − K,1+K] if
α = 1
2. An equilibrium in the robust economy is a value α that satisﬁes F(α,Z;θ
ω
ω)=0 ,w h e r eθ
ω
ω is optimal
for nature at that α.








∂α is negative for any θ
ω
ω > 0.N e x t , w e d e ﬁne ¯ α as the solution to F(¯ α,Z;θ
ω
ω =
1+K)=0 . ¯ α is uniquely determined since ∂F
∂α is negative for all α. Similarly, we deﬁne α as the solution
to F(α,Z;θ
ω
ω =1− K)=0 .S i n c eF(α,Z;θ
ω
ω) is increasing in θ
ω
ω,w eh a v et h a t¯ α>α .
For a value of Z for which ¯ α<1
2, the equilibrium is at ¯ α.N a t u r es e t sθ
ω
ω =1+K if α<1
2,a n dt h i s
value of α satisﬁes market clearing and agents’ ﬁrst order conditions (i.e. F(·)=0 ). Likewise, for a value
of Z for which α > 1
2, the equilibrium is at α.N a t u r e s e t s θ
ω
ω =1− K if α>1
2, and at this value of α
satisﬁes market clearing and agents’ ﬁrst order conditions (i.e. F(·)=0 ). Finally, for a value of Z for which
¯ α ≥ 1
2 ≥ α, the equilibrium is at α = 1
2. Nature is indiﬀerent over the choice of θ
ω







We know that at Z = Z, F(α = 1
2,Z= Z;θ
ω
ω =1 )=0 .S i n c eF is increasing in θ
ω
ω and F is decreasing
in α,w em u s th a v et h a t¯ α>1
2 at Z = Z. Moreover since decreases in Z decrease the function F(·), ¯ α must
25fall as Z falls. Two conclusions follow: It is not possible that α > 1
2;a n df o rZ suﬃciently low ¯ α must fall
below 1
2. The statements of the proposition follow immediately.
The θ
ω
ω of an agent is a function of both K and Z.A sZ falls, robust agents grow increasingly concerned
about receiving a shock second and increase θ
ω
ω in making their own decisions. Likewise as K rises, the
agents directly increaes θ
ω
ω. The agents’ response to a fall in Z is similar to how agents respond to a rise in
K. In this sense, our model generates ﬂight to quality from either a rise in K or a fall in Z.
5.4 Risky collateral and policy
In practice, the collateral of ﬁnancial intermediaries is risky and varies with the underlying state of the
economy (as in Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to endogenize
collateral risk, the comparative static with respect to Z provides some insight into the eﬀects of collateral
risk in our economy.
Starting from a state of the world where Z is plentiful and agents are conﬁdent that they hold safe
ﬁnancial claims, suppose there is a shock that reduces Z. As collateral falls, agents recognize that previously
safe claims become risky as they lose their collateral backing. In response, agents act aggressively to shield
themselves from risk by shedding risky claims and purchasing safe claims, in a manner consistent with a
ﬂight to quality. These actions lock-up the collateral of ﬁnancial intermediaries, and thereby further reduce
the eﬀective collateral of the economy. Our model shows that the robust economy exacerbates the collateral
shortage caused by reduced aggregate collateral, amplifying the standard ﬁnancial accelerator highlighted
by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), among others.
We can also think of the lender of last resort policy in these terms. The problem that agents respond
to is increased collateral risk. To a large extent, private sector collateral will always be perceived as risky —
i.e. intermediaries can never insulate themselves against default risk. A central bank promise, if credible, is
“riskless.” The lender of last resort policy derives beneﬁts because agents are certain that the central bank
will deliver on its promise. The value of such riskless promises rises when private sector collateral is risky.
6 Moral Hazard and Irrelevance Critiques
In this section we discuss our lender of last resort recommendation in light of two prominent critiques of
central bank intervention. The moral hazard critique is that the anticipation of an explicit or implicit
insurance policy leads the private sector to underinsure against shocks and may lead the central bank policy
to backﬁre. The irrelevance critique is that the events warranting insurance, such as the Great Depression,
are so rare in economies with deep and sound ﬁnancial markets, that while in principle the central bank
insurance is useful, in practice it has minimal ex-ante welfare implications.
26In discussing these critiques, we also extend our model to the case of N>2 waves of aggregate shocks.
6.1 Moral hazard critique
The moral hazard critique is predicated on agents responding to the provision of public insurance by cutting
back on their own insurance activities. In our model, in keeping with the moral hazard critique, agents
reallocate insurance away from the publicly insured shock. However, when ﬂight to quality is the concern,
the reallocation improves (ex-post) outcomes on average.16 Public and private provision of insurance are
complements in our model.
We note that the central bank can achieve the same distribution of insurance if instead it commits to
intervene in the ﬁrst shock. However the expected cost of this policy is much larger than the extreme event
intervention, since the central bank rather than the private sector bears the cost of insurance against the
(likely) single-shock event. Agents would reallocate the expected resources from the central bank to the
two-shock event, which is exactly the opposite of what the central bank wants to achieve. In this sense,
interventions in intermediate events are subject to the moral hazard critique.
More formally, let us return to the simpler β =0model and note that the direct beneﬁto fi n t e r v e n t i o n








ω (1)u0(c1,ω)dω = φ(1)u0(c2).
The total beneﬁt, V total

































































The anticipation of the central bank’s ﬁrst-shock insurance leads agents to reoptimize their insurance
decisions. Agents reduce insurance against the ﬁrst-shock (reduce risky claims) and increase their second-
shock claims (increase safe claims). This private insurance reallocation oﬀsets some of the beneﬁts of the
LLR policy. That is, the lender of last resort facility, to be eﬀective and improve private ﬁnancial markets,
has to be a last not an intermediate resort.
16Note that if the direct eﬀect of intervention is insuﬃcient to justify intervention, then the lender of last resort policy is time
inconsistent. This result is not surprising as the beneﬁt of the policy comes precisely from the private sector reaction, not from
the policy itself.
276.2 Multiple shocks
It is clear that the LLR should not intervene during early shocks and instead should only pledge resources
f o rl a t es h o c k s ;b u ti fw em o v ea w a yf r o mo u rt w o - s h o c km o d e lt oam o r er e a l i s t i cc o n t e x tw i t hm u l t i p l e
potential waves of aggregate shocks, how late is late?
To answer this question we introduce multiple shocks into the model. We assume the economy may
experience N waves of shocks, each aﬀecting 1/Nth of the agents. The LLR policy takes the following form:
The central bank injects 1/(N − T +1 )units of liquidity for all shocks after (and including) the Tth wave
(T ≤ N). For simplicity we focus on the fully robust case.



























where we used the fact that one unit of additional collateral allows intermediaries to sell N units of additional
insurance. As before, the anticipation of the central bank’s insurance leads agents to reoptimize their private
insurance decisions. Agents reduce insurance against the publicly insured shocks and increase their private
i n s u r a n c ef o rt h er e s to ft h es h o c k s .T h et o t a lb e n e ﬁt of the intervention includes both the direct beneﬁta s



























In the fully robust case, ci and dci
















28Note that this expression is independent of the intervention rule T. In contrast, it is apparent that ˜ V direct
ZG














is strictly greater than one for all T>1 and is increasing with respect to T.
Of course, the above result does not suggest that intervention should occur only in the Nth shock. Instead
it suggests that for any given amount of resources available for intervention, the LLR should ﬁrst pledge
resources to the Nth shock and continue to do so until it completely replaces private insurance, it should
then move on to the N − 1st shock, and so on.
6.3 Irrelevance critique
The multiple shock model also clariﬁes another beneﬁt of late intervention. As T rises, events that are being
insured by the LLR become increasingly less likely. If we take the case where the shadow cost of the LLR
resources for the central bank is constant, the expected cost of the LLR policy falls as T rises, while the
expected beneﬁt remains constant.
In other words, as T rises, it is the private sector that increasingly improves the allocation of scarce
private resources to early and more likely aggregate shocks, thereby reducing the extent of the ﬂight-to-
quality phenomenon. In contrast, the central bank plays a decreasingly small role in terms of the expected
value of resources actually disbursed, as T increases.
Thus, while a well designed LLR policy may indeed have a direct eﬀect only in highly unlikely events
(hence the irrelevance critique), its main beneﬁts are felt during more likely and less extreme events. These
beneﬁts come from the impact of the policy in unlocking private collateral.
7F i n a l r e m a r k s
Flight to quality is a pervasive phenomenon that exacerbates the impact of recessionary shocks and ﬁnan-
cial accelerators. In this paper we present a model of this phenomenon based on robust decision making by
ﬁnancial specialists. We show that when aggregate intermediation collateral is plentiful, robustness consider-
ations do not interfere with the functioning of private insurance markets (credit lines). However, when agents
think that aggregate intermediation collateral is scarce, they take a set of protective actions to guarantee
themselves safety, but which leave the aggregate economy overexposed to recessionary shocks.
In this context, a Lender of Last Resort policy is useful if used to support extreme rather than intermediate
events. The main beneﬁt of this policy comes not so much from the direct eﬀect of the policy during extreme
29events, which are very rare, but from its ability to unlock private sector collateral during milder, and far
more frequent, contractions.
The implications of the framework extend beyond the particular interpretation we have given to agents
and policymakers. For example, in the international context one could think of our agents as countries and
the policymaker as the IMF or other IFI’s. Then, our model prescribes that the IMF not support the ﬁrst
country hit by a sudden stop, but to commit to intervene once contagion takes place. The beneﬁto ft h i s
policy comes primarily from the additional availability of private resources to limit the impact of the initial
pullback of capital ﬂows.
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